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YOU GOTTA FIGHT FOR YOUR RIGHT TO
REPAIR: THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM




Consumers are keeping their electronic devices longer today than in the past
because the prices of the devices have increased. Increased prices have
culminated in more consumers needing their devices repaired. In turn, manu-
facturers use the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a federal law, and digital
rights management to force consumers to get their devices repaired by either
the device manufacturer or one of its authorized repairers. In response, states
have considered right-to-repair laws which require manufacturers to make re-
pair tools, equipment, and software available to device owners and indepen-
dent repair shops. While almost half of the country’s state legislatures have
considered these bills, no state has enacted one fearing that the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act will preempt any state’s action on the issue. Critics of
these bills argue that the bills conflict with federal law, and therefore, federal
law preempts right-to-repair laws. However, this Article argues that the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act would not preempt a state’s right-to-repair law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the digital revolution currently in full swing, software is now
the driving force behind technological innovation.1 Many consumer-
owned devices run on software. These devices include the obvious,
such as cell phones2 and computers,3 but software also helps to run
many unexpected devices such as coffee makers4 and Barbie dolls.5
Most consumers believe that once they purchase a device it becomes
their property. In truth, however, device manufacturers still have a
considerable amount of ownership in the device. Manufacturers own
copyright protections on the software that runs the device, which al-
lows them to continue to exercise significant control over the device.
To protect their underlying copyrights on the software, copyright
owners place digital rights management (“DRM”) technology on the
devices they manufacture.6 DRM prevents consumers from modifying
the underlying software that runs their device by controlling the types
of interactions consumers have with their device.7 The Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) makes circumvention of DRM ille-
gal.8 In some instances, device manufacturers use DRM and software
to strong-arm consumers into getting their broken devices repaired by
the device maker, rather than a repairer of the consumer’s choice. In
response, some states have considered enacting so-called right-to-re-
pair laws, or fair-repair laws. These laws require manufacturers to of-
fer repair parts to independent repair shops, giving consumers the
freedom to choose their repairer. When states considered these bills,
there were concerns that the laws might run afoul of the DMCA and,
therefore, be preempted by federal law.
1. Marc Andreessen, Why Software Is Eating the World, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20,
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460
[https://perma.cc/4CB3-A9TT].
2. See generally John Haubenreich, Note, The iPhone and the DMCA: Locking
the Hands of Consumers, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1507 (2008).
3. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 542 (2013).
4. See AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP
149–50 (2016) (explaining how the popular coffee maker, Keurig, used digital rights
management to prevent its customers from being able to use rival companies’ coffee
filters, resulting in intense public backlash and causing Keurig to change course).
5. Alyssa Newcomb, Hello Barbie: Internet Connected Doll Can Have Conversa-
tions, ABC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/barbie-
internet-connected-doll-conversations/story?id=29026245 (explaining how new Barbie
dolls can have conversations with the doll’s owner by connecting the doll to the in-
ternet and using an app).
6. E.g., Derek J. Schaffner, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Overex-
tension of Copyright Protection and the Unintended Chilling Effects on Fair Use, Free
Speech, and Innovation, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 146 (2004).
7. See James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719,
1751–52 (2005). See generally PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 4, at 121–39 (de-
fining DRM as the technologies used by copyright holders to control how consumers
use their content).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL205.txt unknown Seq: 3 15-FEB-19 10:39
2019] YOU GOTTA FIGHT FOR YOUR RIGHT TO REPAIR 511
This Article explains why the DMCA will not preempt right-to-re-
pair laws. This Article proceeds in four Sections. Section II discusses
the DMCA, and what actions it prohibits.9 Section III explains the
problem with the DMCA, the solution offered by right-to-repair laws,
and concerns state legislatures have regarding the potential conflict
with federal copyright law.10 Section IV applies preemption doctrine
to right-to-repair laws.11 Finally, Section V examines the policy impli-
cations of right-to-repair laws.12
II. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
Congress enacted the DMCA13 in 1998 to implement the World In-
tellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Treaty, which the United
States agreed to in 1996.14 The Treaty requires signatory parties to
provide legal protection against circumventing technological measures
that protect copyrighted works.15 Although some have suggested the
U.S. did not need to pass a new law to enforce the WIPO Treaty,
Congress enacted the DMCA to implement it.16
The DMCA creates three liability provisions.17 First, § 1201(a)(1)
prohibits “circumvent[ion] [of] a technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected” by copyright.18 Second,
§ 1201(a)(2) prohibits the trafficking of technology that circumvents
“a technological measure that effectively controls access to a [copy-
righted] work . . . .”19 Third, § 1201(b)(1) prohibits the trafficking of
technology that circumvents “protection afforded by a technological
9. See infra notes 13–31 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 32–70 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 71–261 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 262–70 and accompanying text.
13. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
14. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001); H.R.
REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 9 (1998).
15. Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 440 (citing Word Intellectual Property Or-
ganization Treaty art. 11, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S.
121).
16. Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1103 (2003)
(arguing that when the United States signed the WIPO Treaty, the doctrine of con-
tributory infringement already provided adequate legal protections to copyright own-
ers, and no new congressional act was necessary to comply with the Treaty).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
18. Id. § 1201(a)(1). In this subsection, circumvention of a technological measure
means to “descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise
to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the
authority of the copyright owner.” Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
19. Id. § 1201(a)(2) (emphasis added). In its interpretation of the DMCA, how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit did not recognize a claim under section 1201(a)(2). MDY In-
dus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 944 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit
held there were “two distinct types of claims” under the DMCA. The first was the
anti-circumvention provision found in § 1201(a), and the second was the anti-traffick-
ing provision found in § 1201(b)(1). Id.
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measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner . . . .”20
Thus, the DMCA makes it illegal to circumvent DRM or traffic in
tools that enable circumvention.
To illustrate, consider circumvention as a home invasion. Section
1201(a)(1) is equivalent to the prohibition against breaking into an-
other’s home.21 The invasion of another’s home is the crime. Similarly,
§ 1201(a)(2) penalizes trafficking tools—such as lock picks—used to
break into another’s home.22 Section 1201(b), however, is significantly
different than the first two prohibitions. Section 1201(b) is the
equivalent of a guest who has been invited into a home, but once in-
side, the guest violates the homeowner’s rules, refuses to leave, and
thereby trespasses.23
The above examples show the slight distinction between
§§ 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b), but the rights that each section protects are
markedly different. While it is easier to show these distinctions when
discussing non-copyright law violations, applied in their proper con-
text, the slight distinctions become more difficult to illuminate.
As applied to copyright issues, § 1201(a)(1) prohibits a person from
breaking into a copyrighted work that technology locks out.24 For ex-
ample, a movie studio can encrypt a DVD, only allowing the public to
play—but not copy—the movie. If a person decrypts that DVD, the
person would be liable under the DMCA.25 The reason for decrypting
the DVD would not matter; it is the act of circumvention that makes
one liable.26 Thus, intent does not matter; a person who decrypts a
DVD to skip previews or save clips for educational purposes would be
just as liable as one who decrypts a DVD for more sinister reasons.27
Using the same example, a person would be liable under
§ 1201(a)(2) if a person trafficked the decryption device. For example,
a person would be liable if he or she placed a downloadable file on the
internet that allows anyone with the file to decrypt DVDs.28
Likewise, a person would be liable under § 1201(b) if the person
trafficked a product that circumvents a technological measure that
protects a copyrighted work. But unlike § 1201(a), the act of circum-
vention does not create liability, as there is no equivalent to
20. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
21. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12a.03(D) (2017).
22. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 329 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001) (comparing the anti-trafficking provision to laws that prohibit the possession of
burglar tools); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 21, §12A.03(D)(1).
23. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 21, §12A.03(D)(2).
24. Id. § 12A.03(A)(1).
25. Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 300 (3d Cir. 2011).
26. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
27. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 4, at 132.
28. See Universal City Studios, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
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§ 1201(a)(1) for rights control.29 For example, a person who buys an
eBook gets a version of the book but with several restrictions that a
physical book would not have.30 Trafficking a device that removes
these restrictions violates § 1201(b).31
III. STATES’ RESPONSES
A. The Need for Right-to-Repair Acts
Copyright owners use the DMCA and DRM to protect their copy-
rights.32 In essence, copyright owners use DRM to limit the access
consumers have to the copyright—the underlying software that runs
the device.33
Companies that use this technology reason that by buying a device,
a consumer does not acquire the software, nor is the consumer the
new software owner.34 And, without DRM, a consumer would have
unfettered access to the software and could modify it, which could
affect the device’s safety, control, security, and functionality. There-
fore, these companies use DRM to “protect against the unauthorized
reproduction and destruction of [their] copyrighted works.”35
Preventing modification of copyrighted software makes sense to a
degree. For example, John Deere, in support of its contention that
manufacturers need DRM to prevent modification of vehicle makers’
copyrighted software, noted that such modifications have safety and
security implications. John Deere argued modification could result in
vehicles acting unexpectedly, which could cause traffic accidents and
personal injuries and result in non-compliance with safety and vehicle
emissions regulations.36 Likewise, Apple claimed modifications to its
software would raise safety and security concerns. The iPhone’s iOS
software is designed to shut the phone down if it overheats, and it
stops the charging process once the phone is fully charged.37 Further,
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2012); R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Con-
trols and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 623 (2003).
30. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 4, at 1–3.
31. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (hold-
ing a company that trafficked in software that allowed consumers to remove restric-
tions placed on eBooks violated § 1201(b)).
32. See Schaffner, supra note 6, at 146.
33. Id.
34. Darin Bartholomew & John Deere, Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Ex-
emption Under 17 U.S.C. 1201, COPYRIGHT OFF. 4, https://www.copyright.gov/1201/
2015/comments-032715/class%2022/John_Deere_Class22_1201_2014.pdf (last visited
Mar. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/MJZ4-Q336].
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 2.
37. David L. Hayes & Apple, Responsive Comment of Apple Inc. in Opposition to
Proposed Exemption 5A and 11A (Class #1), COPYRIGHT OFF. 8, available at https://
www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/apple-inc-31.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/7Y7W-R5P5].
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iOS requires programs to run in certain ways to prevent the phone
from getting viruses or opening security holes, which would allow
hackers to get information from the phone.38 John Deere and Apple
maintain that without DRM, consumers can modify the software to
remove the built-in safety systems, making the device unsafe.
However, manufacturers also use DRM and the DMCA to prevent
consumers from fixing their broken devices. The software that runs
these devices can recognize when a non-genuine part replaces a bro-
ken part.39 Manufacturers can design the software to shut down the
device after recognizing the non-genuine part.40 Any attempt to mod-
ify the software to make the device operable again violates the
DMCA.
For example, in 2016, consumers who replaced broken iPhone parts
with non-genuine Apple parts received an error when updating their
phones to iOS 9.41 For a time, consumers who received this error no
longer had functioning phones; their phones were “bricked”—mean-
ing they were functionally equivalent to a brick.42 This error affected
all iPhone 6 users that had their home button repaired by a repairer
other than Apple.43 Eventually, after public backlash, Apple released
a software update that resolved the error.44 Although the error was
resolved, Apple, in a not-so-subtle way, warned its customers: Do not
use non-genuine Apple parts to fix your device, or else.
The update to iOS 9 was not the only iOS update that caused head-
aches for consumers who had their phones fixed with non-genuine
parts. In 2017, Apple—once again—released an update to iOS 11 that
fixed an issue that some consumers experienced after having their
phones fixed with non-genuine parts.45 But this time, Apple provided
an express warning:
38. Id.
39. See Jason Koebler, Latest iOS Update Shows Apple Can Use Software to Break
Phones Repaired by Independent Shops, VICE (Oct. 13, 2017, 2:24 PM), https://mother
board.vice.com/en_us/article /bjv9jz /apple- ios-11-repair-screens-software-update
[https://perma.cc/S4LH-W4UP].
40. Id.
41. Buster Hein, Everything You Need to Know About iOS’ Crippling ‘Error 53’,
CULT OF MAC (Feb. 9, 2016, 2:30 PM), https://www.cultofmac.com/411395/everything-
you-need-to-know-about-ios-crippling-error-53/ [https://perma.cc/35CL-QHM8].
42. Miles Brignall, ‘Error 53’ Fury Mounts as Apple Software Update Threatens to
Kill Your iPhone 6, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2016, 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
money/2016/feb/05/error-53-apple-iphone-software-update-handset-worthless-third-
party-repair [https://perma.cc/48UK-N7CM].
43. Hein, supra note 41. Those in the repair industry said that the error affected
more than just phones that had their home buttons repaired. They said the error also
affected users who had their phone screens replaced. Id.
44. Juli Clover, Apple Releases Updated Version of iOS 9.2.1 to Fix Devices
Bricked by ‘Error 53’, MACRUMORS (Feb. 18, 2016, 10:19 AM), https://www.mac
rumors.com/2016/02/18/apple-ios-9-2-1-error-53-fix/ [https://perma.cc/J6F2-96S3].
45. Koebler, supra note 39.
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Note: Non-genuine replacement displays may have compromised
visual quality and may fail to work correctly. Apple-certified screen
repairs are performed by trusted experts who use genuine Apple
parts. See support.apple.com for more information.46
Although expressly stated, the message was the same: Do not let any-
one other than Apple work on your iPhone.
Using software locks to stop consumers from getting their devices
repaired by anyone other than the manufacturer is not unique to Ap-
ple or the phone industry. John Deere uses software that requires its
tractors to be fixed by one of its technicians at one of its dealerships.47
Likewise, makers of household appliances, such as refrigerators and
air-conditioners, include these locks on devices they manufacture.48
B. Introduction of Right-to-Repair Acts
Since 2015, states have responded to consumers’ lack of freedom to
choose how to fix their devices by trying to enact right-to-repair
laws.49 These laws require manufacturers to offer repair instructions
and parts to independent repair technicians.50 During the legislative
sessions following the 2016 elections, almost half of the country’s state
legislatures considered right-to-repair laws.51 Although no state has
46. Id.
47. Jason Koebler, Why American Farmers Are Hacking Their Tractors With
Ukrainian Firmware, VICE (Mar. 21, 2017, 3:17 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en
_us/article/xykkkd/why-american-farmers-are-hacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-
firmware [https://perma.cc/85SR-HZ6K].
48. Jason Koebler, The iPhone 7 Has Arbitrary Software Locks That Prevent Re-
pair, VICE (Apr. 7, 2017, 10:02 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/
kbjm8e/iphone-7-home-button-unreplaceable-repair-software-lock [https://perma.cc/
K9V3-7XLY].
49. In February 2015, the Minnesota House and Senate, and the New York Senate
introduced right to repair bills. See Minnesota’s S.F. 873, 2015 Leg., 89th Sess. (Minn.
2015); H.R. 1048, 2015 Leg., 89th Sess. (Minn. 2015); S.B. 3998, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
50. Karen Turner, Apple Wants to Kill a Bill That Could Make It Easier for You to




51. The states are California, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Assemb. B.
2110, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); H.B. 1649, 2018 Leg., 29th
Sess. (Haw. 2018); H.B. 3030, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); H. File 556,
87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2017); H.B. 2122, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan.
2017); S.B. 96, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); H.B. 143, 119th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); S.F. 15, 2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017); H.R.
287, 2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017); H.B. 1178, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2017); Legis. B. 67, 150th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2017); H.B. 1733, 2018 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.H. 2018); Assemb. B. 4934, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2017); S.B. 618,
2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); Assemb. B. 8192, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2017); H.B. 663, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017); H.B. 2551, 56th
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yet enacted this type of law, each year state legislatures proceed fur-
ther in the legislative process than they did during previous legislative
sessions.52
Each state’s version of the right-to-repair bill is slightly different,
but the goals and overall statutory schemes are similar. Generally, the
bills require manufacturers to do three things. First, manufacturers
must make repair information, diagnostic software, updates to
firmware, and similar items available to independent repair facilities
free of charge.53 Second, manufacturers must also make repair parts
available for sale to the owner of the device.54 Third, manufacturers
must make repair tools available for sale to independent repair facili-
ties.55 Further, most bills clarify that once a manufacturer provides the
information, parts, and tools, they are no longer responsible for the
devices’ functionality.56 Most versions do not require a manufacturer
to divulge a trade secret to comply with the bill, end any contract that
a manufacturer might have with an authorized repairer, or provide
any information beyond what the bill expressly mandates.57
Despite the similar goals and schemes, there are some differences
between each state’s version. The versions considered by the Kansas
and Wyoming legislatures only applied to farming equipment, while
other states’ versions applied to electronic devices generally.58 Many
states have expressly excluded motor vehicles from their bills,59 and
others have excluded medical devices.60 Legislatures likely excluded
these devices because they intend for the bills to apply to small con-
Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2018); S.B. 888, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017);
H.B. 1382, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017); S.B. 180, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Vt. 2018); H.B. 20, 2018 Leg., 2018 Sess. (Va. 2018); H.B. 2279, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2018); H.B. 199, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2017).
52. See, e.g., Legis. B. 67, 105th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2017) (receiving a committee
hearing); H.B. 2279, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (passing out of the Technology
& Economic Development Committee); H.B. 199, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2017)
(passing out of the Agriculture, State and Public Lands and Water Resources
Committee).
53. See, e.g., Leg. B. 67, 105th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3 (Neb. 2017); Assemb. B. 8192,
2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 2017).
54. See, e.g., H.B. 1649, 29th Leg., 29th Sess. § 3 (Haw. 2018); H.R. 287, 2017 Leg.,
90th Sess. § 1 (Minn. 2017).
55. See, e.g., H.B. 2122, 2017 Leg., 87th Sess. § 3 (Kan. 2017); H.B. 143, 190th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Mass. 2017).
56. See, e.g., H.B. 2551, 56th Leg., 2d Sess. § 3 (Okla. 2018); H.B. 199, 64th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 1 (Wyo. 2017).
57. See, e.g., H.F. 556, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Iowa 2018); H.B. 2279,
65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Wash. 2018).
58. Compare H.B. 2122, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2017) (applying to farm
equipment), and H.B. 199, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2017) (applying to farm equip-
ment), with, e.g., H.B. 663, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017) (applying
to any digital electronic product that contains a microprocessor).
59. See, e.g., H.B. 3030, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 40 (Ill. 2017). But see,
e.g., H.B. 1178, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § A (Mo. 2017).
60. See, e.g., H.B. 20, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 574 (Va. 2018). But see, e.g.,
S.B. 888, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017).
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sumer electronic devices such as cell phones. Legislatures likely found
John Deere’s argument that application to motor vehicles can cause
traffic accidents, personal injuries, and non-compliance with vehicle
emissions compelling. So, out of an abundance of caution, some states
have excluded motor vehicles, medical devices, or both.
C. Preemption Concerns
When state legislative committees began to hear right-to-repair
bills, one of the primary concerns expressed by legislators, industry
groups who opposed the bills, and supporters of the bills was the im-
pact that federal copyright law would have on the bills—specifically
the DMCA.61 For example, prior to the Wyoming Agriculture Com-
mittee’s vote in favor of their version of the law, committee members
discussed federal copyright law.62 Likewise, opponents to the Wash-
ington version warned that the bill “may violate federal copyright
protections.”63
Similarly, when the Nebraska right-to-repair bill went before the
unicameral’s Judiciary Committee, senators and interested parties ex-
pressed concern about federal copyright law’s impact on the bill. One
Committee member questioned why the bill’s proponents were com-
ing to the Nebraska legislature for relief. He opined that the propo-
nents “might be coming to the wrong place for [a] resolution,” and
instead they should lobby Congress.64 That Committee member went
on to say, “a federal solution is what [the bill’s proponents] ought to
be looking at.”65
Representatives of the technology industry testified before the
Committee and expressed concerns that the bill would endanger their
copyrights and conflict with the DMCA. The Entertainment Software
Association, a trade association for the video game industry, opposed
61. The Nebraska bill was one of the first bills to receive a committee hearing, and
the Nebraska Legislature is the only state to have transcripts of the committee hear-
ing publicly available. Therefore, this subsection will go into greater detail on the
Nebraska committee hearing. However, the comments made before the Nebraska
committee were similar to the comments made before other states’ committees that
considered these bills. Further, I interviewed several legislators from other states who
sat on committees that heard their state’s version of the bill. Information gleaned
from these interviews is also discussed.
62. Telephone Interview with Hans Hunt, Chairman of the House Agric., State &
Pub. Lands, & Water Res. Comm., Wyo. Leg. (Oct. 15, 2017). However, the impact
federal copyright law may have on the Wyoming bill was not a primary concern of the
committee because the Wyoming bill was narrowly tailored to farming equipment and
the Library of Congress exempts farming equipment. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(6)
(2017).
63. Letter from CompTIA to Jeff Morris, Chair of the Wash. House Tech. & Econ.
Dev. Comm. (Jan. 8, 2018) (on file with Wash. House Tech. & Econ Dev. Comm).
64. Hearing on L.B. 67 Before the Judiciary Comm., 105th Leg., 1st Sess. 42 (Neb.
2017) [hereinafter Nebraska Hearing] (statement of Sen. Ernie Chambers, Member,
Judiciary Comm.).
65. Id.
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the bill and argued it would “create some very complicated conflicts
with U.S. copyright law.”66 Additionally, the Computing Technology
Industry Association, an IT trade group, opposed the bill and was
much blunter in its assessment of the DMCA’s impact on the bill. The
group said the bill would bring U.S. copyright law into a gray area and
risk violating the DMCA.67
Finally, proponents of the bill explained to the Committee how cur-
rent laws adversely affect their ability to operate small, independent
repair shops. The owner of an independent repair shop explained how
he made videos showing how to repair Apple devices and placed the
videos on the internet.68 Apple threatened to sue the owner of the
repair shop unless he removed the videos from the internet.69 He re-
moved the videos after he consulted with an attorney who informed
him that Apple had a potentially viable copyright claim against him.70
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF RIGHT-TO-REPAIR LAWS
In our system of federalism, the states and the federal government
each have their own power that the other must respect.71 There can be
times, however, where a state and the federal government have laws
that conflict. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides
a resolution to these conflicts.72 The Supremacy Clause states that fed-
eral law is “the supreme Law of the Land”; therefore, federal law
preempts state law.73 Preemption is the process by which a state law in
conflict with a federal law becomes invalidated.74
Preemption can be express or implied.75 Express preemption occurs
when a statute’s language expressly preempts state law.76 Implied pre-
66. Id. at 44 (statement of Michael Warnecke, Representative, Entertainment
Software Association).
67. Id. at 43 (statement of Alexi Madon, Representative, Computing Technology
Industry Association).
68. Id. at 12–13 (statement of Louis Rossmann, Owner, Rossmann Repair
Group); see also Ben Lovejoy, Bad Month for Apple Repairs as Tekserve to Close,
Louis Rossmann Videos Likely to Disappear, 9TO5 MAC (Jul. 1, 2016, 4:15 AM),
https://9to5mac.com/2016/07/01/tekserve-closure-louis-rossman-videos/ [https://perma
.cc/9K7L-PE57].
69. Nebraska Hearing, supra note 64, at 13 (statement of Louis Rossmann, Owner,
Rossmann Repair Group).
70. Id.
71. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012). See also Murphy v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018) (“[B]oth the Federal Govern-
ment and the States wield sovereign powers, and that is why our system of govern-
ment is said to be one of ‘dual sovereignty.’”).
72. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. cl. 2.
73. Id.
74. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (“This means that when federal and state law
conflict, federal law prevails, and state law is preempted.”).
75. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
76. Id. at 99.
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emption includes field and conflict preemption.77 Field preemption
occurs when Congress has left no room for the states to regulate in the
field.78 Conflict preemption occurs in two ways: (1) when “compliance
with both federal and state regulation is a physical impossibility,” or
(2) when a state’s law is an obstacle to the federal objective.79 Thus,
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized three ways federal law can
preempt, and therefore nullify, state law: express preemption, field
preemption, and conflict preemption.80
Congress enacted § 301 (“Copyright Preemption Statute”) of the
Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”), which expressly preempts
all other state and common law copyright claims.81 Since Congress
passed the Copyright Preemption Statute, courts typically do not ad-
dress field or conflict preemption when determining if the Copyright
Act preempts a state law.82 This lack of court attention is likely be-
cause courts presume the Copyright Preemption Statute encompasses
the Act’s full preemptive effects.83 Therefore, this Article focuses on
express preemption.84
The Copyright Preemption Statute of the Copyright Act expressly
preempts state law if the state law: (1) falls within the scope of copy-
right subject matter; and (2) grants rights “equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.”85
Combining the DMCA and the Copyright Preemption Statute’s vast
preemptive effects will not preempt a right-to-repair law. First, state
legislatures do not intend for right-to-repair laws to be copyright laws.
Second, Congress did not intend the DMCA to be a copyright law.
The Copyright Preemption Statute, therefore, does not apply to the
DMCA and is unable to preempt state laws. Third, even if the DMCA
can preempt state laws, the Copyright Preemption Statute cannot pre-
empt right-to-repair laws because they contain additional elements.
Finally, the doctrine of implied preemption will not preempt a right-
to-repair law. Each of these points will be further examined.
77. Id. at 98.
78. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
79. Id. at 399–400.
80. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98; Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); ac-
cord Arizona, 567 U.S. at 398–400.
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
82. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616,
623 (2008).
83. Id.
84. This Article addresses implied preemption only to refute claims that right-to-
repair laws could be either field or conflict preempted.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 301; Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., 786 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2015);
accord Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 429
(2d Cir. 2012); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001).
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A. State Legislatures’ Intent
Right-to-repair laws are beyond the scope of the Copyright Pre-
emption Statute because they are consumer-protection-laws—not
copyright laws. Virtually all state legislatures that have considered
right-to-repair laws have correctly considered them as consumer pro-
tection laws. Therefore, right-to-repair laws are not subject to the
Copyright Preemption Statute’s preemptive effects.
The fact that right-to-repair laws are consumer-protection laws is
evident in several ways. First, legislatures referred right-to-repair bills
to committees with jurisdiction over consumer-protection-type laws.
For example, the legislatures from Nebraska, Vermont, and Wyoming
referred their bills to the Judiciary Committee, the Committee on Ec-
onomic Development, Housing, and General Affairs, and the Agricul-
ture, State, and Public Lands and Water Resources Committee,
respectively, where they each received committee hearings.86
Second, these bills amend or add to parts of the codes or titles that
govern consumer protection. For example, the Wyoming version adds
a new section in the Farm and Ranch Operations Chapter of the Agri-
culture, Livestock, and Other Animals Title.87 Likewise, the New
York version adds a new section in the Miscellaneous Article of the
General Business Law Code,88 and the North Carolina version adds a
new Article to the Monopolies, Trusts, and Consumer Protection
Chapter.89 Therefore, state legislatures intend right-to-repair laws to
be consumer-protection laws.
Protecting citizens from unfair trade practices by enacting con-
sumer-protection laws is a traditional police power of the states, not of
the federal government.90 Thus, courts give states more deference
when construing preemption principles of a state consumer protection
law than a non-traditional, police-power state law. In Florida Lime,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state statute based on this presump-
tion.91 In that case, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s regulations
allowed farmers to pick South Florida avocados once they had ma-
tured.92 The federal law based its test for maturity on a schedule of
86. See, e.g., LEG. JOURNAL, 150th Leg., 1st. Sess., at 86 (Neb. 2017); S. JOURNAL,
2018 Leg. Sess., at 16 (Vt. 2018); H. JOURNAL, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess., at 323 (Wyo.
2017). But see H. Journal, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., at 2790 (Mo. 2017) (referred
to Select Committee on Local, State, Federal Relations, and Miscellaneous Business);
H. JOURNAL, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 98 (Kan. 2017) (referred to Committee on Fed-
eral and State Affairs).
87. H.B. 199, 2017 Gen. Sess., 64th Leg. § 1 (Wyo. 2017).
88. S.B. 618, 239th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.Y. 2017); H.B. 8192, 239th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §1 (N.Y. 2017).
89. H.B. 663, Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. § 1 (N.C. 2017).
90. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 36 n.19 (2007) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634 F.3d 779, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2011); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1990).
91. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 156 (1963).
92. Id. at 139.
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picking dates.93 California law, on the other hand, prohibited the sale
of avocados with less than 8% of oil by weight.94
The Court determined that the California law was a food safety
law—a traditional power of the states.95 With this determination in
mind, the Court narrowly interpreted the federal regulation’s preemp-
tive effects on the California law.96 The Court construed the federal
regulations to apply to the “picking, processing, and transporting of”
avocados, while the state law regulated the marketing of avocados.97
The Court noted that just because Congress regulates on one end of
the stream of commerce, that does not preclude a state from regulat-
ing at the other end.98
Thus, right-to-repair laws are consumer protection laws, which are a
traditional state police power. And, as the Supreme Court has noted
many times, in all preemption cases, courts “start with the assumption
that the historic police power of the States [are] not to be superseded
by [f]ederal [a]ct unless [it is] the clear manifest purpose of Con-
gress.”99 Thus, federal law’s preemptive effects are narrowly con-
strued when the state law in question is an exercise of the state’s
traditional police power. Further, Congress’s “regulation[s] at of one
end of the stream of commerce does not [foreclose] . . . state regula-
tion at the other end.”100
Narrowly interpreting the federal regulation’s preemptive effect on
right-to-repair laws would lead to the same result as in Florida Lime—
that the state law is not preempted. Much like the California law,
right-to-repair laws and federal regulations operate on opposite ends
of the stream of commerce spectrum. The DMCA regulates on the
manufacturing side of the stream of commerce, while right-to-repair
laws regulate on the repair side. The DMCA’s regulations on the man-
ufacturing side of the stream of commerce do not preempt right-to-
repair regulations on the repair side of the stream of commerce.
Therefore, the Copyright Preemption Statute does not preempt a
right-to-repair law.
B. Congress’s Intent to Preempt
Congress’s intent is the key in all preemption cases.101 Even when
Congress has enacted a statute that expressly preempts state law,
courts look at Congress’s intent to determine the full power of the
93. Id.
94. Id. at 133.
95. Id. at 144.
96. See id. at 145.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 US. 555, 565 (2009).
100. Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 145.
101. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565.
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statute’s preemptive effect.102 Thus, in express preemption cases, the
courts focus on the language of the preemption statute because it is
the best evidence of Congress’s intent.103
The Copyright Preemption Statute preempts all state copyright
claims, which shows Congress intended a uniform copyright system.
However, Congress did not intend the Copyright Preemption Statute
to apply to the DMCA because Congress did not intend the DMCA to
be a copyright law. The DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision lacks
the characteristics of traditional copyright laws and can be more accu-
rately described as an anti-hacking law.104 Although the short title of
the Act describes it as a copyright act, that description is not disposi-
tive.105 Indeed, the DMCA’s legislative history shows that Congress
did not intend a new copyright law.
The WIPO Treaty required signatory nations to provide “adequate
legal protection[s] . . . against the circumvention of effective techno-
logical measures.106 At the time, U.S. copyright law already protected
against circumvention, so much so that the Clinton administration
originally planned to submit the Treaty to the Senate without imple-
menting legislation.107 However, content-owning industry groups saw
the WIPO Treaty and an implementing act as a way to expand their
copyright protection.108 Nevertheless, Congress ultimately passed im-
plementing legislation—the DMCA—and content-owning industry
groups successfully lobbied Congress to enact an anti-circumvention
provision beyond the requirements of the treaty.109
When Congress considered H.R. 2281, the bill that ultimately be-
came the DMCA, Congress acknowledged that questions existed re-
garding whether the bill was a traditional copyright law.110 Congress
referred H.R. 2281 to both the House Committee on the Judiciary and
102. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011).
103. Id.
104. Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 63, 135 (2003) (“Title I of the DMCA goes beyond traditional copyright ap-
proaches in order to address the threat of unauthorized reproduction and distribution
of copyrighted works in the digital age.”). See generally David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair
Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 686 (2000) (not-
ing the DMCA’s main provision is not copyright infringement).
105. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (“[T]he name given to
an act by way of designation or description . . . cannot change the plain import of its
words.”).
106. Word Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Apr. 12,
1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 38542.
107. Burk, supra note 16, at 1103.
108. See id.
109. See id.; see also Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA.
J. INT’L L. 369, 409–15 (1997) (noting that language similar to the DMCA’s anti-cir-
cumvention provision was rejected at the WIPO’s diplomatic conference because
other countries thought that either the anti-circumvention provision was unnecessary
or that the language was too broad).
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24–25 (1998).
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the House Committee on Commerce.111 The Commerce Committee
believed that H.R. 2281 concerned “much more than intellectual
property.”112 During the committee process, the Commerce Commit-
tee adopted an amendment that moved the anti-circumvention provi-
sion out of Title 17—the copyright law portion of the United States
Code—and made it a freestanding provision of law.113 The committee
reasoned that the anti-circumvention provision should not be in Title
17 because those “provision[s] have little, if anything, to do with copy-
right law.”114 Indeed, Congress asserted its constitutional ability to en-
act the DMCA came from the commerce clause, rather than the
copyright clause.115
Further, the Commerce Committee noted the anti-circumvention
provision was a sharp deviation from how Congress had historically
fulfilled its constitutional objective of promoting “the Progress of Sci-
ence and the useful Arts.”116 Historically, federal copyright law regu-
lated copyrighted information, not the technology that disseminated
the information.117 The Commerce Committee observed that the Cop-
yright Act is technologically neutral, meaning certain actions are pro-
hibited—but not the commerce in information technology, i.e., the
devices by which the information is disseminated.118
The Commerce Committee agreed with a group of what it described
as “distinguished copyright law professors” who wrote to the Commit-
tee expressing their concerns about the bill.119 The professors warned
that while Congress may ultimately codify the anti-circumvention pro-
vision in Title 17, the liability that this provision creates is a “separate
and independent” action from copyright infringement.120 The profes-
sors also warned against what they described as “paracopyright,”121
which creates liability for one who attempts to circumvent a techno-
logical measure that protects a copyrighted work.122 The professors
noted that the conduct the anti-circumvention provisions prohibit
have “traditionally . . . fallen outside the regulatory sphere of intellec-
tual property law.”123 The Commerce Committee agreed with the
professors’ claims but acknowledged that there must be some law that
111. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 1 (1998) (Judiciary); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551,
pt. 2, at 21 (commerce).
112. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 22.
113. Id. at 23.
114. Id. at 24.
115. Id. at 35.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
117. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24.
118. Id. at 24.
119. Id. at 24–25.
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id.
122. Nimmer, supra note 104, at 727 nn.292–94.
123. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25.
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protects copyright owners from the unique threat that the digital envi-
ronment poses.124
For these reasons, the House Committee on Commerce voted on
and adopted an amendment to H.R. 2281 that made the anti-circum-
vention portions free-standing sections of law, rather than a part of
Title 17.125 Although the Senate ultimately changed the House version
of the bill, this legislative history shows that Congress did not intend
the DMCA to be a traditional copyright law which could expressly
preempt state laws. Thus, the DMCA cannot preempt state law. Be-
cause Congress did not intend the DMCA to be a new copyright law,
the Copyright Preemption Statute’s express preemption powers do
not apply. Therefore, a state’s right-to-repair law would be valid.
C. The Copyright Preemption Statute’s Preemptive Effect
The Copyright Preemption Statute preempts all state and common
law causes of action which grant the same legal rights as those granted
by the Copyright Act.126
1. Subject Matter and General Scope Requirement
The Copyright Preemption Statute preempts a state claim if the
state claim: (1) falls within the scope of copyright subject matter, and
(2) grants rights “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright.”127 Courts generally refer to these two ele-
ments as the Subject Matter Requirement and the General Scope Re-
quirement, respectively.128
First, courts broadly interpret the Subject Matter Requirement to
include works that contain non-copyrightable materials.129 For exam-
ple, in 1983, the Second Circuit held in Harper & Row that President
Gerald Ford’s memoirs, which contained non-copyrightable facts, met
the subject matter requirement.130 In that case, a magazine acquired a
copy of President Ford’s manuscript, and the magazine published in-
formation about Ford’s public and political life.131 The court reasoned
that while the information published was non-copyrightable, the mem-
oir was copyrightable. Therefore, the memoir met the Subject Matter
Requirement.132 If it did not meet the Subject Matter Requirement,
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
127. Id.; Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., 786 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2015); accord Forest
Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 429 (2d Cir. 2012);
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001).
128. See Forest Park Pictures, 683 F.3d at 429–30.
129. Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phx. Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2004).
130. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nat’l Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir.
1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
131. See id. at 198–99.
132. Id. at 200.
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the court feared states would be able to enact their own copyright
protections for materials that contained both copyrightable and non-
copyrightable material, which would directly oppose one of the Act’s
central goals.133 Thus, a work consisting of non-copyrightable material
can still meet this requirement if the work broadly fits into a copy-
rightable category.134
Second, a state claim is beyond the General Scope Requirement if it
is “qualitatively different” from a right that the Copyright Act pro-
tects.135 Thus, a state cause of action that is qualitatively different
from a right protected by Title 17 is not preempted, and thus valid.
There are two ways courts examine whether a state claim is qualita-
tively different. First, courts consider the rights the plaintiff is seeking
to protect.136 Second, courts determine if the state cause of action con-
tains additional elements beyond what the Copyright Act requires.137
It is well established that software can be copyrighted.138 Thus,
right-to-repair laws meet the first prong of this test because the work
in question is software. Regardless, the second prong of the test—the
General Scope Requirement—is not met. The Copyright Preemption
Statute would not preempt a state’s right-to-repair law because the
plaintiff would seek to protect rights that are qualitatively different
from what the Copyright Act protects. Likewise, right-to-repair laws
require additional elements beyond what the Copyright Act requires.
Right-to-repair laws are designed so that the non-copyright owner
institutes the lawsuit. For example, some bills have a provision that
requires the independent repair shop to inform the manufacturer in
writing that the independent repair shop believes the manufacturer
has failed to comply with the law, then allow thirty-days for the manu-
facturer to cure the lack of compliance before bringing suit.139 But,
other bills require the state attorney general to institute a civil suit to
enforce the law.140 No matter the setup the state chooses, the law pre-
supposes that the party instituting the action is either the attorney
general or an independent repair shop—not the copyright holder.
Therefore, the right the plaintiff would seek to protect would be
enforcement of the right-to-repair law itself. This throws a wrench in
the Copyright Act preemption analysis because there is no copyright
claim, so no federal law exists to analyze. In this scenario, plaintiffs
133. Id.
134. Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305.
135. Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., 786 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2015).
136. Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306.
137. Ryan, 786 F.3d at 760.
138. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 21, § 2A.10(B).
139. See, e.g., S.B. 96, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 9 (Mass. 2017); H.B. 143,
119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 9 (Mass. 2017); H.B. 199, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1
(Wyo. 2017).
140. See, e.g., Leg. B. 67, 150th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8 (Neb. 2017); H.B. 2279, 65th
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Wash. 2018).
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would protect their ability to access repair parts and information via a
state cause of action—something totally divorced from federal copy-
right law. Thus, the Copyright Preemption Statute’s preemptive power
would not enter the analysis.
2. The Extra Element Requirement
Another way courts determine that a state cause of action is qualita-
tively different is if it contains additional elements beyond that which
the Copyright Act requires.141 The courts take a restrictive view of
what constitutes “extra elements,” and thus a qualitatively different
claim.142 To be a qualitatively different claim, the additional element
must change the cause of action’s nature and not just its scope.143 For
example, requiring a plaintiff to also show breach of fiduciary duty
would change the action’s nature.144 However, adding a scienter re-
quirement would not make the claim qualitatively different because
that only alters the cause of action’s scope and not its nature.145
In one of the first cases to consider whether the Copyright Preemp-
tion Statute preempts a state claim, the Eighth Circuit held that a con-
tract claim was different from a copyright claim.146 In that case,
Computer Associates created software and licensed it to National Car
Rental.147 The license agreement provided that National Car Rental
could only use the software to process its own data.148 However, Com-
puter Associates learned that National Car Rental was using the
software to process data of third parties.149 Computer Associates
sued, claiming that National Car Rental breached the license agree-
ment and infringed on Computer Associates’ copyright.150
The Eighth Circuit rejected National Car Rental’s argument that
the breach of contract claim protected a right equivalent to Computer
Associates’ copyright claim, and therefore is preempted by the Copy-
right Preemption Statute.151 The court explained the addition of an
element beyond “the act[ ] of reproduction, performance, distribution
or display” causes the claim to fall outside of the general scope of
copyright.152 Further, the court could not find any precedent sug-
gesting that breaching a contract constituted copyright infringe-
141. Ryan, 786 F.3d at 760; Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306.
142. Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306.
143. Comput. Ass’n Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992).
144. Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306.
145. Comput. Ass’n Int’l, 982 F.2d at 717; Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306.
146. Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Comput. Ass’n Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 430–31
(8th Cir. 1993).
147. Id. at 427.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 428.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 430–31.
152. Id. at 431.
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ment.153 Therefore, because the breach of contract claim is outside the
general scope of copyright, the claim could not be preempted.154
Thus, a state law that incorporates elements beyond reproduction,
or the like, is not equivalent, so the state law is not preempted.155
Determining if right-to-repair laws have additional elements beyond
those of the DMCA requires an understanding of the elements of the
DMCA.
a. The DMCA’s Elements
Various federal courts of appeals have reached different conclusions
regarding the elements of the DMCA.156 The two interpretations of
the law are best exemplified by the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain
Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc,157 and the Ninth Circuit in
MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.158 In 2004, the
Federal Circuit in Chamberlain adopted a narrow reading of the
DMCA. But six years later, the Ninth Circuit in Blizzard adopted a
much broader reading of the statute. The elements a plaintiff is re-
quired to show, therefore, differ depending on jurisdiction.
In Chamberlain, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that adopting the plain meaning of the DMCA would lead to an “ab-
surd and disastrous” result.159 Therefore, the court reasoned there
must be a “reasonable relationship” between the circumvention and
the copyright infringement.160 The Chamberlain court, in effect, en-
graved into the DMCA a requirement that a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant’s action infringed a valid copyright.161 The court estab-
lished this requirement because it had concerns regarding the policy
implications without such a requirement.162
153. See id. at 431–32. Other Federal Courts of Appeals have followed this same
holding. Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990)
(“This action for breach of contract involves an element in addition to mere reproduc-
tion, distribution or display: the contract promise made by [appellants], therefore, it is
not preempted.”); accord Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.
1988); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeindenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
154. See Nat’l Car Rental Sys., 991 F.2d at 431.
155. R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1147 (10th Cir. 2009).
156. Compare MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir.
2010) (construing narrowly the DMCA), with Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink
Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing broadly the DMCA). See gen-
erally Theresa M. Troupson, Note, Yes, It’s Illegal to Cheat a Paywall: Access Rights
and the DMCA’s Anticircumvention Provision, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 325, 336–49 (2015)
(explaining the two interpretations).
157. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1178.
158. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 928.
159. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201.
160. Id. at 1202.
161. Id. at 1203.
162. See Troupson, supra note 156, at 342.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL205.txt unknown Seq: 20 15-FEB-19 10:39
528 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
Chamberlain Group, Inc. (“Chamberlain”) makes automatic garage
door openers and remotes.163 Traditional garage door openers use a
unique but fixed binary-coded signal to open the door.164 However,
Chamberlain developed a garage door opener that used a code that
changed each time the owner opened and closed their door, which it
called a “rolling code.”165 Chamberlain copyrighted this rolling code
technology.166 Chamberlain claimed its rolling code technology pre-
vents a burglar from using a “code grabber” to learn a homeowner’s
unique code, then replay that code when the burglar has safe and easy
access to the home.167
Skylink Technologies, Inc. (“Skylink”) was a universal garage door
opener manufacturer.168 Despite Chamberlain’s rolling code technol-
ogy, Skylink developed a universal remote that opened garage doors
allegedly using Chamberlain’s rolling code technology.169 However,
Skylink’s universal remote did not use Chamberlain’s rolling code
technology; instead, it used the traditional binary signal.170 Skylink
took advantage of a resynchronization flaw in the rolling code tech-
nology, which allowed a traditional binary signal to work.171
By exploiting this flaw, Chamberlain claimed Skylink violated the
anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA.172 It is important to note
that Chamberlain never claimed or asserted that Skylink had infringed
on Chamberlain’s copyrighted rolling code technology.173 Skylink
moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted,174 and
Chamberlain appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that
Skylink did not violate the DMCA.175 The court began its analysis by
rejecting Chamberlain’s claim that the DMCA established new prop-
erty rights; instead, the court held the DMCA merely establishes a
new cause of action for which a defendant can be liable, and it pro-
vides a new mechanism for copyright holders to secure their
copyrights.176
Chamberlain argued that the court should read the DMCA as Con-
gress wrote it—that there is no connection between circumvention




167. Id. at 1183–84.
168. Id. at 1184.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1184–85.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1185.
173. Id.
174. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1041
(N.D. Ill. 2003).
175. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204.
176. Id. at 1192–94.
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and copyright access.177 Chamberlain pointed to the Southern District
of New York’s ruling in Reimerdes for the proposition that anti-cir-
cumvention can occur with or without copyright infringement.178 The
court rejected this contention stating that there was a “significant dif-
ference[ ]” between the action of the defendants in Reimerdes and
Skylink.179 Unlike the Reimerdes defendants, whose product was ca-
pable of only one use—infringing on copyrighted software—Skylink’s
product had legitimate uses.180
The court also found fault with Chamberlain’s broad interpretation
of the DMCA.181 The court noted under Chamberlain’s broad con-
struction, a defendant could be liable for circumvention, even if the
defendant’s access is granted to the public under the Copyright Act.182
Such an interpretation, the court held, would be “irrational.”183 In ad-
dition to finding fault with the practical effects of Chamberlain’s
broad interpretation,184 the court noted that Chamberlain’s interpre-
tation would “flatly contradict” another provision of the DMCA.185
Therefore, the Chamberlain court held that the DMCA requires a
reasonable relationship between the circumvention and copyright in-
fringement.186 To prove a claim under the DMCA, a plaintiff must
show:
(1) Ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively con-
trolled by a technological measure, which has been circumvented,
(3) that third parties can now access (4) without authorization, in a
manner that (5) infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected
by the Copyright Act, because of a product that (6) the defendant
either (i) designed or produced primarily for circumvention; (ii)
made available despite only limited commercial significance other
than circumvention; or (iii) marketed for use in circumvention of
the controlling technological measure.187
A plaintiff needs to only show one of the three sub-elements under
element six to establish a prima facie claim.188
177. Id. at 1197.
178. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 319 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 27 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001).
179. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1198.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1200.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. The court said under Chamberlain’s construction of the law, a burglar who
gains access to a home that contains books, music, or art that was copyrighted by
disabling an alarm, violates the DMCA. The court said the remedy to “this type of
behavior lie[s] in tort and criminal law, not in copyright law.” Id. at 1201.
185. Id. at 1200.
186. Id. at 1202.
187. Id. at 1203 (emphasis omitted).
188. Id.
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The Chamberlain court made a policy decision when it held that
circumvention, in and of itself, does not violate the DMCA and in-
stead required there to also be a copyright infringement. The Cham-
berlain court is not the only court to hold that there must be a link
between the circumvention and copyright infringement.189 The Fed-
eral Circuit has since reaffirmed its decision in Chamberlain.190 The
Fourth Circuit has endorsed this interpretation,191 and other district
courts have also followed this analysis.192 Alternatively, the Sixth Cir-
cuit used different reasoning to come to the same conclusion. In
Lexmark, the Sixth Circuit held that the DMCA required a plaintiff to
show that the defendant did something beyond mere circumven-
tion.193 A plaintiff must show that the defendant affected the copy-
righted content.194
On the other hand, in MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertain-
ment, Inc.,195 the Ninth Circuit adopted a much broader reading of the
statute than did the Chamberlain court. The Blizzard court adopted
the plain-meaning of the DMCA and expressly rejected the Chamber-
lain court’s reasonable relationship requirement.196 The Ninth Circuit
held that the DMCA’s legislative history suggests that Congress
sought to make the act of circumvention illegal, and it did not intend a
reasonable relationship requirement.197
Blizzard Entertainment is the creator of World of Warcraft
(“WoW”), a popular online computer game.198 The goal of WoW is to
advance from level to level by battling monsters and participating in
189. See Troupson, supra note 156, at 328 (concluding the narrow interpretation
approach is the more popular of the two approaches).
190. See Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421
F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
191. Chambers v. Amazon.com, Inc., 632 F. App’x 742, 744 (4th Cir. 2015) (“A
copyright owner alleging a violation of the DMCA must prove that the circumvention
of the technological measure either infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected
by the Copyright Act.”) (citing Storage Tech. Corp., 421 F.3d at 1318) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
192. RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 931–32
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (“The DMCA created new causes of action both for circumvention
of access controls in ways that facilitate copyright infringement and for trafficking in
circumvention devices that facilitate copyright infringement.”) (citing Chamberlain
Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); AGFA Mono-
type Corp. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1034–35 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (apply-
ing the Chamberlain test).
193. Lexmark Int’l., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 549 (6th
Cir. 2004).
194. Id.
195. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010).
196. Id. at 952.
197. Id. Further, the Ninth Circuit held that, even assuming the validity of the pol-
icy concerns that the Chamberlain court brought up, the court cannot override the
statute’s plain meaning and Congress’s intent when enacting the statute. See id.
198. Id. at 935.
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quests, while collecting weapons and in-game money.199 This is a
deeply time-intensive game—one in which players have spent millions
of hours playing.200
Michael Donnelly, the sole member of MDY Industries, LLC
(“MDY”) is a WoW player and software developer.201 Donnelly de-
veloped a software program that simulates the early levels of WoW
and allows a player to progress through those levels without having to
actually play them.202 Soon after developing this program, Donnelly
started selling it to WoW players on MDY’s website.203 As a result of
Donnelly’s software, as well as other similar types of software, Bliz-
zard launched its own software that prevented players from using pro-
grams similar to Donnelly’s.204 Donnelly responded by updating his
program to prevent Blizzard’s program from detecting when players
used Donnelly’s program.205
Blizzard sent MDY Industries a cease-and-desist letter claiming that
Donnelly and MDY had violated Blizzard’s copyrights.206 Donnelly
responded by seeking a declaratory judgment stating that his program
does not infringe on Blizzard’s copyright.207 Blizzard filed a counter-
claim against Donnelly and MDY claiming they violated, among other
things, the DMCA.208 The district court granted MDY’s partial sum-
mary judgment finding that it did not violate the DMCA.209
The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and held that
MDY was liable under the DMCA.210 The court began its analysis by
determining the proper scope of the DMCA.211 The court held that
the DMCA creates two new claims: one for anti-circumvention of a
technological measure and one for trafficking anti-circumvention
technologies.212 Importantly, the court used the statute’s plain mean-
ing to interpret the DMCA to allow for a broader set of claims.213 The
199. Id.
200. Kate Cox, Nearly 6 Million Years of World of Warcraft Health for Players’
Brains, KOTAKU, (Mar. 9, 2012, 9:30 PM), https://kotaku.com/5891421/nearly-6-milli
on-years-of-world-of-warcraft-healthy-for-players-brains [https://perma.cc/6V7R-
9ULE] (explaining that WoW players have combined to play almost six million years
of WoW).
201. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 934–35.
202. Id. at 935.




207. Id. at 937.
208. Id.
209. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 975 (D. Ariz.
2009), vacated, 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010).
210. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 957.
211. Id. at 943.
212. Id. at 944.
213. Troupson, supra note 156, at 340.
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court reached this conclusion by holding that the anti-circumvention
provision creates a “right distinct from copyright.”214
The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Chamberlain court’s rea-
sonable relationship requirement.215 The Ninth Circuit held that the
DMCA’s plain meaning and its legislative history indicate Congress
intended to prevent non-copyright infringing circumvention.216 Fur-
ther, as the court noted, the policy concerns that the Chamberlain
court addressed are better left for Congress to resolve—not the
courts.217
Therefore, unlike the Chamberlain court, the Blizzard court held
that a defendant can be liable under the DMCA without infringing on
the copyright that the copyright owner’s technology protects.218 To
prove a claim under the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant: “(1) Traffics in (2) a technol-
ogy or part thereof (3) that is primarily designed, produced, or mar-
keted for, or has limited commercially significant use other than (4)
circumventing a technological measure (5) that effectively controls ac-
cess (6) to a copyrighted work.”219 The court ruled that MDY was
liable under the DMCA220 without finding that MDY had infringed on
Blizzard’s copyrights.221
The Blizzard court is not the only court to interpret the DMCA
broadly. The Ninth Circuit has since reaffirmed its decision in Bliz-
zard.222 The Third223 and Fifth224 Circuits have also adopted this
broad interpretation.
b. Right-to-Repair Elements
The Federal courts of appeals have outlined two different sets of
elements that a plaintiff must show to assert a claim under the
DMCA. However, there are additional elements that right-to-repair
laws require when applying either test. Therefore, the Copyright Pre-
emption Statute will not preempt right-to-repair legislation.
Right-to-repair laws encompass elements beyond that of the
DMCA. The Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit have developed differ-
214. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 948.
215. Id. at 950.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 944.
219. Id. at 953.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 941–42.
222. See Disney Enter., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017).
223. See Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 300 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that a plaintiff can assert a claim under the DMCA that is separate from an
infringement claim under the Copyright Act).
224. See MGE UPS Sys. v. GE Consumer & Indus. Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir.
2010) (“Because § 1201(a)(1) is targeted at circumvention, it does not apply to the use
of copyrighted works after the technological measure has been circumvented.”).
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ent tests encompassing different elements to establish a cause of ac-
tion under the DMCA. The Federal Circuit requires that a plaintiff
show:
(1) Ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively con-
trolled by a technological measure, which has been circumvented,
(3) that third parties can now access (4) without authorization, in a
manner that (5) infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected
by the Copyright Act, because of a product that (6) the defendant
either (i) designed or produced primarily for circumvention; (ii)
made available despite only limited commercial significance other
than circumvention; or (iii) marketed for use in circumvention of
the controlling technological measure.225
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit requires a plaintiff to show that a de-
fendant: “(1) Traffics in (2) a technology or part thereof (3) that is
primarily designed, produced, or marketed for, or has limited com-
mercially significant use other than (4) circumventing a technological
measure (5) that effectively controls access (6) to a copyrighted
work.”226
The elements for a cause of action under a right-to-repair law are
markedly different than the DMCA-required elements, no matter
which test a jurisdiction applies. Right-to-repair laws require a plain-
tiff to show: (1) the manufacturer sold and used the device in the state;
(2) the manufacturer did not make available to the owner of the de-
vice or an independent repairer (i) repair information, software,
firmware, or similar items, (ii) repair parts, or (iii) repair tools; and (3)
the owner or independent repairer notified the manufacturer of the
manufacturer’s non-compliance with the law and gave it time to cure
the non-compliance.227
Because right-to-repair laws contain additional elements, the
DMCA does not preempt them. As stated above, federal law will not
preempt a state law if the state law contains an extra element that
changes the claim to a qualitatively different claim from a copyright
claim.228 Courts will analyze a claim to identify core elements and de-
termine if the claims are qualitatively different.229 The core element of
a right-to-repair claim is the manufacturer’s disclosure of repair infor-
225. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
226. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 953.
227. See, e.g., S.B. 96, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); Leg. B. 67,
150th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2017); H.B. 1733, 165th Leg., Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.H. 2018); S.B. 180, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Vt. 2018) (as introduced); H.B.
2279, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); H.B. 199, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2017).
228. Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 1993).
229. See Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Arkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1993)
(“[B]reach of a duty of trust or confidentiality comprises the core of actions for trade
secret misappropriation, and supplies the extra element.”) (quotations omitted) (cit-
ing Comput. Ass’ns Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1982); S.O.S., Inc. v.
Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1090 n.13 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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mation.230 The core element of a claim under the DMCA is the cir-
cumvention of a technological measure that effectively controls
access. These two core elements are qualitatively different.
Under a right-to-repair claim, failure of the manufacturer to pro-
vide the owner of a device with the necessary parts, tools, and
software serves as the core element because this failure is the sole
reason for the proposed enactment. States are directly responding to
their citizens’ complaints that they cannot efficiently fix their de-
vices.231 Moreover, this element is what gives right-to-repair laws their
teeth, and it is the element that critics frequently cite as their main
concern.232
By contrast, the DMCA’s core element—circumvention of a tech-
nological measure that effectively controls access—is qualitatively dif-
ferent from the right-to-repair element. The DMCA’s core element
concerns the device’s design and manufacturing process. Manufactur-
ers must ensure that the device is protected with DRM. The DMCA’s
core requirement differs from the right-to-repair’s element, which
only comes into play once the device has hit the market and consum-
ers have used the device long enough that they must repair it.
Therefore, the core elements of the DMCA and right-to-repair laws
are qualitatively different, and the second element of right-to-repair
laws creates an extra element. Thus, the DMCA would not preempt
right-to-repair laws.
D. Implied Preemption
Although three different types of preemption exist, the Supreme
Court has stated that each category is not distinct; they are species of
each other.233 The Court has identified Congress’s intent as a key in
preemption analysis. All preemption cases are guided by “the purpose
of Congress,”234 and a state law will only be preempted if “it is the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”235 In express preemption
cases, courts focus on the plain language of the preemption statute, as
that is the best evidence of Congress’s intent.236 In implied preemp-
tion cases, courts must also look to Congress’s intent to determine if
230. See Jason Koebler, Apple Must Explain Why It Doesn’t Want You to Fix Your
Own iPhone, California Lawmaker Says, VICE (Mar. 12, 2018, 11:42 AM), https://
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/evmeya/apple-iphone-right-to-repair-california
[https://perma.cc/RBQ7-59J2] (author of the California version explaining that with-
out the California version consumers “can[no]t repair [their] own” devices).
231. See, e.g., S.B 180, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. § 1 (Vt. 2018) (House Proposal of
Amendment); H.B. 2279, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Wash. 2018).
232. See Koebler, supra note 230.
233. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
234. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
235. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (internal quotation
omitted).
236. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011).
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field or conflict preemption exists.237 Thus, Congress’s lack of intent
to expressly preempt state law applies with equal force to show that
Congress did not implicitly intend to preempt state law.
Congress has not implicitly preempted the field of copyright; thus,
right-to-repair laws are not implicitly preempted. Field preemption
does not apply because Congress does not regulate the entire field of
copyright, leaving some room for the states. Conflict preemption does
not apply because compliance with both right-to-repair laws and the
DMCA is possible, and right-to-repair laws do not impede the
DMCA’s objective.
First, the Supreme Court has suggested that Congress has not pre-
empted the entire copyright field. In 2015, by denying a petition for
certiorari, the Court tacitly agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s determina-
tion that Congress has not preempted the copyright field.238 As the
Ninth Circuit explained, “Congress did not, however, preempt the
field when it enacted the Copyright Act.”239
Further, the Supreme Court explicitly held that Congress did not
preempt the field when Congress enacted the Copyright Act’s preced-
ing version. In Goldstein v. California, the Court reasoned that when
the states entered the Union, they retained the sovereign power they
possessed prior to joining the Union unless the Constitution exclu-
sively gave a power to the federal government or expressly took away
a power from the states.240 The Court also noted that when states en-
tered the Union, many states already had their own copyright laws.241
Further, the Copyright Clause of the Constitution did not give the fed-
eral government exclusive control over copyrights.242 Therefore, “the
States have not relinquished all power to grant to authors ‘the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings.’”243 Thus, Congress has not
preempted the field of copyright law.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, once again, emphasized that the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution does not prevent the states from
enacting their own copyright laws.244 The Court determined that so
long as a state law offers limited protections and those protections do
not impermissibly interfere with the federal scheme, then the state’s
law is valid.245 The Court also suggested that if the state law is limited
to goals beyond Congress’s contemplation in the federal scheme, then
237. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399–400 (2012).
238. Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 786 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 267 (2015).
239. Id.
240. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973).
241. Id. at 557.
242. Id. at 558.
243. Id. at 560.
244. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989).
245. Id.
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the state law is valid.246 Therefore, even if a court considered right-to-
repair laws to be copyright laws, they would not be field preempted.
Further, when enacting the DMCA, Congress aimed to prevent
piracy via the internet247 and retain incentives for the creation of new
works.248 Right-to-repair laws do not interfere with this scheme be-
cause the same incentives still exist to create new works. Plus, Con-
gress did not likely contemplate that the DMCA would prevent
consumers from repairing their devices because Congress was more
concerned that the law could be used to stop new products from
reaching consumers.249 Right-to-repair laws, on the other hand, ex-
pressly deal with consumers’ ability to repair their devices.
Thus, right-to-repair laws will not be field preempted because states
still have the power to regulate some areas of copyright law. Further,
these laws are narrow enough so as not to interfere with the federal
scheme, and they only legislate in areas beyond Congress’s
contemplation.
Second, assuming that right-to-repair laws are copyright laws, con-
flict preemption would still not apply. When compliance with both the
state and federal law is physically impossible, or when the state law is
an obstacle to the federal objective, the federal law preempts state
law. In Florida Lime, the Supreme Court gave an example of when
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible.250 If a fed-
eral law only allowed fruit to be picked when its oil content was more
than 7% and state law did not allow the same fruit to be picked if its
oil content was 8% or less, then compliance with both is impossible.251
Thus, based on this example, when the Court says compliance must be
physically impossible, it means just that—not possible.252
A device manufacturer can provide repair parts, tools, and software
to the owner while also complying with the requirements of the
DMCA. Merely providing repair parts, tools, and software to device
owners will not preclude manufacturers from asserting a claim against
those who infringe on their copyrights because right-to-repair laws do
not take away the ability to assert DMCA claims. A manufacturer,
complying with right-to-repair requirements, could still meet all the
elements for a claim under the DMCA, applying either the Chamber-
246. See id.
247. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 10 (1998).
248. Michael H. Wolk, Note, The iPhone Jailbreaking Exemption and the Issue of
Openness, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 827 (2010).
249. Cf. 144 CONG. REC. S4890 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ash-
croft) (“If history is a guide, however, someone may try to use this bill as a basis for
initiating litigation to stop legitimate new products from coming to market.”).
250. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
251. Id. at 143.
252. See United States v. Denver, 916 F. Supp. 1058, 1062 (D. Colo.) (holding that
it is physically impossible to comply with both an EPA order requiring the clean-up of
a hazardous waste site and a city’s cease and desist order prohibiting the same clean-
up), aff’d, 100 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996).
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lain253 or the Blizzard254 test. The element that appears on its face to
be the most difficult to meet would be the effectively-controls-access
element of both tests because a manufacture is required to give diag-
nostic software updates,255 which arguably prevents a manufacturer
from controlling access. However, plaintiffs could still meet this ele-
ment because right-to-repair laws only require diagnostic software,
not the underlying software that runs the device.256 And, any attempt
to control access to the underlying software, even ineffective attempts,
meet this element.257
Even if compliance with both state and federal law is possible, con-
flict preemption still exists if the state law provides an obstacle to the
federal objective.258 When Congress enacted the DMCA, its objective
was to ensure that digital copyright holders have the same protections
as traditional copyright holders.259 Congress considered that the new
technology of the digital age put copyrighted materials at risk and thus
provided new protections for copyright holders to create in this new
environment.260
Right-to-repair laws do not affect the DMCA’s objective because
Congress and the states have two different policy objectives that do
not conflict with each other. Congress seeks to provide copyright pro-
tections in the digital age, while states seek to protect consumers from
unfair trade practices.261 By allowing consumers to repair their own
devices, states are not altering the protections Congress afforded to
digital copyright holders. Thus, federal law does not preempt right-to-
repair laws.
V. POLICY
States should also consider implementing right-to-repair laws for
three public policy reasons. First, it is significantly cheaper for con-
sumers to fix their devices themselves or via an independent repairer.
Second, by repairing broken devices and thus possessing the devices
for longer periods, consumers will reduce electronic waste. Finally,
253. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
254. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 953 (9th Cir. 2010).
255. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
256. Id.
257. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429
(2d Cir. 2001).
258. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399–400 (2012).
259. See Noelle S. A. Green, Comment, A Tale of Three EULAs: Why Some End
User Licenses Agreement Should Be Preempted by the Anticircumvention Provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 57 HOW. L.J. 701, 722 (2014).
260. S. REP. NO. 105–90, at 2 (1998); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1 at 9
(1998) (“With this evolution in technology, the law must adapt in order to make digi-
tal networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted works.”).
261. See, e.g., H.B. 2279, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Wash. 2018).
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right-to-repair laws comport with Congress’s same policy goal as the
DMCA.
First, self-repair of broken devices is significantly less expensive
than repair at an authorized repair shop. For example, as the Wall
Street Journal recently noted, fixing a broken part of a television can
cost as little as $12.262 However, getting the television fixed by an au-
thorized repairer would cost, at a minimum, $215—almost as much as
a new television.263 Also, consumers encounter time and geographic
constraints associated with authorized repair shops. Authorized repair
shops do not exist in rural areas, so consumers there are forced to
drive considerable distances to get their devices fixed.264 Authorized
repair shops may also have long wait times, meaning that consumers
would be unable to fix their devices for days or weeks.265 Right-to-
repair laws allow consumers to fix their devices at nearby independent
shops for reasonable prices in a timely manner.
Second, when consumers are unable to get their devices fixed, they
often throw them out and buy new ones.266 Old or broken electronic
devices are known as electronic waste. The amount of electronic waste
is increasing rapidly, and “is now the nation’s fastest growing category
of solid waste.”267 In 2009, Americans threw out 141 million phones,
or about 350,000 phones per day.268 Once the devices are thrown out,
harmful materials, such as lead and cadmium, can end up in soil,
262. Geoffrey A. Fowler, We Need the Right to Repair Our Gadgets, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 8, 2015, 3:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/we-need-the-right-to-repair-
our-gadgets-1441737868 [https://perma.cc/VL5Z-5R9T] (explaining how having a bro-
ken television fixed by an authorized repair shop would cost almost as much as buying
the TV new again, whereas self-repair costs as little as $12).
263. See id.
264. See Nebraska Hearing, supra note 64, at 3 (statement of Sen. Lydia Brasch)
(explaining that the Apple store nearest to her home is more than 80 miles away); see
also Nicholas Deleon, Right-to-Repair Laws could Make It Easier to Get a Phone or
Laptop Fixed, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/con
sumer-protection/right-to-repair-laws-could-make-it-easier-to-get-a-phone-or-laptop-
fixed/ [https://perma.cc/PM7J-CGA8] (noting that North Dakota and South Dakota
do not have any Apple stores, and that Alaska, Kansas, and Maine each have one).
265. See Fair Servicing and Repair of Digital Electronic Products: Hearing on H.B.
2279 Before the Tech. & Econ. Dev. Comm., 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (state-
ment of Brian Engelhard) (explaining that it would take more than a week to get an
iPhone repaired at an authorized repair shop), https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=
2018011062 [https://perma.cc/HL36-6J6A].
266. Cf. Jennifer Chen, Note, The Efficiency and Management of the International
Trade in Electronic Waste: Is There a Better Plan Than a Ban?, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
142, 143 (2014) (explaining how the turnover of electronic devices leads to electronic
waste).
267. Heather L. Drayton, Note, Economics of Electronic Waste Disposal Regula-
tions, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 149, 149 (2007).
268. Nathan Proctor, Recharge Repair, U.S. PUB. INST. RES. GRP. (Feb. 8, 2018),
https:// uspirg . org / sites / pirg / files / reports / CAP _ Recharge _ Repair _ Feb1 _ 2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QLU7-WXFL].
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water, and food supplies.269 Allowing consumers to fix their own de-
vices will reduce the number of broken devices that are thrown out
because consumers will use the fixed devices for longer periods, which
will decrease the number of disposed devices, therefore reducing envi-
ronmental damage.
Finally, right-to-repair laws can co-exist with Congress’s policy be-
hind the DMCA. When Congress enacted the DMCA, its goal was to
provide an environment where copyright holders had incentives to
create new works.270 Right-to-repair laws do not infringe on this pol-
icy goal. Allowing consumers to repair their broken devices does not
change the incentives to create new works that Congress developed.
The incentives are still in place because copyright holders will still cre-
ate new devices with the latest and most powerful technological com-
puting power. The only difference is that consumers will be able to fix
those new devices themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
In October 2018, the Library of Congress issued new regulations
that allow consumers to fix their electronic devices.271 However, these
new rules are not a long-term solution or one that ends the right-to-
repair debate. First, the Library of Congress is required to review its
circumvention rules once every three years,272 and when reviewing the
rules in the future, the Library of Congress could remove these new
rules. Second, states have still considered right-to-repair laws even af-
ter the Library of Congress has issued rules that exempted a class of
devices.273 So states will still likely push for these laws. Finally, the
new rules do not go as far as right-to-repair legislation would have
required because the new rules do not require device makers to re-
lease diagnostic tools.274 Indeed, right-to-repair advocates will con-
tinue to push state legislatures to pass right-to-repair laws.275
269. Electronic Waste, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ceh/risks/ewaste/
en/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2AKA-CUC3].
270. Wolk, supra note 248, at 827.
271. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 54010, 54029–30 (Oct. 26, 2018) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
272. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012).
273. For example, Wyoming’s bill was limited to farm equipment, and the Library
of Congress had already exempted farming equipment. See supra note 62.
274. See Hamza Shaban, ‘Right-To-Repair’ Advocates Claim Major Victory in New




275. Molly Wood, That Time it Was Illegal to Fix Your Own Electronics . . . For
Almost 20 Years, MARKETPLACE, (Nov. 6, 2018, 5:09 AM), https://www.marketplace
.org/2018/11/05/tech/time-it-was-illegal-fix-your-own-electronics-almost-20-years
[https://perma.cc/CX4T-EPRJ].
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Despite the claims made by the technology industry in statehouses
across the country, federal copyright laws will not preempt right-to-
repair laws. First, right-to-repair laws are not copyright laws, so the
Copyright Preemption Statute does not apply. Second, Congress did
not intend the DMCA to be a copyright law; thus, the Copyright Pre-
emption Statute does not apply to the DMCA. Third, right-to-repair
laws include additional elements compared to the DMCA; therefore,
the DMCA does not implicitly preempt these laws. Finally, neither
one of the implied preemption doctrines will preempt a state’s right-
to-repair law. Therefore, given the importance of right-to-repair laws,
states should not hesitate to enact these laws
